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The failure of
regime transformation:
a reply
Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald

J.

Puchala

We welcome the commentary by Helge Bergesen on our introductory and
concluding chapters in the special issue of International Organization on the
global political economy of food. We have little to offer as a joinder to his
comments, since he is in substantial agreement with both our analysis and
recommendations. Moreover, his observation that achieving the prescribed
regime will be difficult usefully makes explicit a key point implicit in our
analysis. His recital of the political and institutional barriers to realizing a
transformation of the current regime are especially timely. Certainly the
collapse of the negotiations for an international grain reserve to enhance world
food security in 1979, and growing difficulties in expanding food aid and
assistance to improve food and agricultural development, drive one to
pessimistic assessments regarding the degree of change in the current regime
invoked by the 1973-74 crisis. In light of these recent failures it is certainly
appropriate to dwell on the difficulties blighting the possibility of ever
achieving the prescribed regime.
Bergesen does offer two points with which we do take exception, however. First, noting that we overlooked the "problem" of overconsumption
in rich countries, he proposes that an attack on such overconsumption might
be a useful step that could "lead to a change in distribution of power in the
western food systems by strengthening a political/cultural force which works
in favor of an international solution to the world hunger problem." And second, he alleges that the proposition that increased interdependence "leads naturally to enhanced political cooperation" is an implicit assumption in our
argument that is empirically contradicted by evidence.
It is true that we did not include overconsumption as a problem in the
global political economy of food. The reason is simple: it did not seem gerInternationat Organization 34,2, Spring 1980
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mane. Per capita caloric consumption in the United States and several other
industrialized European countries has in fact declined slightly over the last half
century. This decrease is due largely to changing lifestyles and taste. People
work less hard, expend less energy on the whole, and eat far less starch. The
sedentary lifestyle of people in rich countries probably contributes more to
health problems than do their nutritional habits. Admittedly and deplorably,
gluttony and hunger exist side by side in rich countries, but this issue is not
central to the political and economic forces shaping the diplomacy of food.
Moreover, the peripheral effects of rich-country diets are mixed. Note that
large amounts of grain, which otherwise would have been used for animal
feeding, were freed up for export from the United States during the food crisis
of 1973-74, as D. Gale Johnson points out. 1 This is a hidden asset in grain-fed
animal production. It gave the United States one more degree of backup
capability in bearing a large portion of the adjustment caused by the worldwide grain shortfall. If livestock growers had been unable to switch to
strategies of slaughtering more animals and putting more on pasture land in
response to high grain prices, the plight of the world's poor would probably
have been even more adversely affected in the critical shortage years. Thus,
overconsumption strikes us as not a food problem; rather it is a health
problem.
No doubt there is a correlation between international altruism among the
elite of industrialized countries and awareness that eating fat is unhealthy;
however this is most likely an artifact of the level of education and the cultural
milieu within which such elite circulate. Mass opinion on food issues is rather
different, as a March 1979 Gallup poll, undertaken by Carter's Commission
of World Hunger, shows. Those with lesser education and income give lower
priority to world hunger as a problem. Emphasizing better health through
better diets, therefore, seems a dubious prescription for mobilizing public
opinion to the point where it might "tip the balance" or lead to "a new international food policy from the western countries." That elite priorities about
world hunger need to be altered significantly seems clear; that a focus on
overconsumption might accomplish this seems unlikely.
More troublesome is Bergesen's argument concerning economic interdependence. He incorrectly attributes to us the assumption that interdependence leads "naturally" to cooperation. Underlying much of our
analysis is an assumption about the effects of interdependence-namely, that
significant interdependence, especially when accompanied by disrupting
events, forces government and corporate elites to deal with problems arising
from such worldwide interconnections. The greater the interdependence, the
greater the compulsion for elites to take action. Such action can be defensive
or conflictual, as well as collaborative or cooperative. In the current global
food regime, and particularly over the last half decade, elite actions have
manifested all of these traits. Bergesen is correct to observe an increase in
' D. Gale Johnson, "World food institutions: a liberal view," International Organization 39,3:
844.
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conflict. We are equally correct to note in the same period an increase in
collaboration and in cooperation.
In general, we are in disagreement with Bergesen on two points. First,
increased interdependence does not lead "naturally" to anything per SCi!
(neither cooperation, as he incorrectly alleges we assume, nor conflict, as he
argues). Second, responses from 1972 through 1977 to global food problems
arising from or soluable through international transactions were characterized
by both heightened and cooperative activity. International action was more
ineffectual than conflictful-although unquestionably some elements of conflict emerged.
For any problem arising in a context of international economic interdependence, whether conflict or cooperation will be the dominant trait in
the responses of concerned actors depends upon various factors, including
whether a reduction of dependence is seen as a solution to the problem. For a
number of countries increasing their food self-sufficiency is certainly
desirable. But it is unclear that achieving greater self-sufficiency among states
would increase the consensus needed to achieve greater food security through a
system of international reserves, as Bergesen argues. Countries with less stake
in food imports would also seem less interested in contributing to reserve
mechanisms that would provide for it. As for conflict between First and Third
World countries over food issues, it is clear that in specific food arenas, such
as the World Food Program, the World Food Council, the FAO, and the 1974
World Food Conference, Group B countries and the Group of 77 countries
have regularly clashed over the size of resource transfers and their guaranteed
availability through greater international control. Somehow arguments between recipients and donors over the size of the donation do not strike us as evidence of conflict per se, since both sides agree on the principle of donation. It
is equally interesting to note the absence of food as a serious item of dispute in
those arenas in which North-South conflict is quite sharp and which deal with
the more fundamental rules of economic order. For instance at the UNCTAD
sessions of 1976 and 1979 and the CIEC meeting of 1976-77 little concern was
evidenced over food issues; the Third World did not put these on the central
agenda because food was not an area of substantial conflict. Thus while we
accept Bergesen's point that interdependence may increase conflict, we think
its most predictable effect is simply to increase the attention and action of elite
specialists in different countries when confronted with problems. Both conflictual and collaborative efforts are likely to emerge from attempts to resolve
problems that either arise from or may be addressed by interdependent activity.
To summarize, we welcome Bergensen's commentary. His pessimistic assessment about the prospects for reforming the current food regime is accurate. We are, however, skeptical that an attack on overconsumption in rich
countries offers a solution to barriers to regime change and we reject his interpretation of the relationship between economic interdependence and
political response, both that which he attributes to us and the oppositenamely, that interdependence promotes conflict.
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